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Mental time travel refers to the ability to cast one’smind back in time to re-experience a past
event and forward in time to pre-experience events that may occur in the future. Tulving
(2005), an authority on mental time travel, holds that this ability is unique to humans.
Anticipating that comparative psychologists would challenge this claim, Tulving (2005)
proposed his spoon test, a test speciﬁcally designed to assesswhether non-human animals
are capable of mental time travel. A number of studies have now employed the spoon test
to assess mental time travel in non-human animals. Here, we review the evidence for
mental time travel in primates. To provide a benchmark, we also review studies that have
employed the spoon test with preschool children. The review demonstrates that if we
compare the performance of great apes to that of preschool children, and hold them to the
same criteria, the data suggest mental travel is present but not ubiquitous in great apes.
Keywords: mental time travel, episodic memory, episodic foresight,Tulving’s spoon test, comparative cognition
At its heart, comparative psychology is founded on the principle of
continuity. Darwin (1871) articulated this principle perfectlywhen
he stated that anydifferences betweenhumanandnon-humanani-
malminds are differences of degree (i.e., quantitative) but not kind
(i.e., qualitative). Undoubtedly, the vast and growing comparative
literature is consistent with Darwin’s (1871) view, however, several
recent reviews have suggested that discontinuities may also exist
(Tulving, 2005; Premack, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007;
Penn et al., 2008). On this point, views range from Penn et al.’s
(2008, pp. 110) contention that Darwin (1871) was mistaken and
overlooked the “profound functional discontinuity between the
human and non-human mind” to a more nuanced view suggest-
ing that, although the principle of mental continuity largely holds
true, there are examples of discontinuity in mind between human
and non-human animals (Tulving, 2005). In the current review
we tackle one of the more widely asserted discontinuities – mental
time travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Roberts, 2002;
Suddendorf and Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2005). The term mental
time travel was coined by Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) and
denotes the ability to cast one’s mind not only back in time to re-
experience a past event (i.e., episodic memory) but also forward
in time (i.e., episodic foresight) to pre-experience events that may
occur in the future.
Tulving (1983) initially conceptualized mental time travel
purely in terms of the recall of past events (i.e., what) and their
spatial (i.e., where) and temporal (i.e., when) context (Tulving,
1983). However, the fact that an individual could remember these
aspects of an event without having personally experiencing it, led
to a reconceptualization that included autonoetic consciousness or
the knowledge that one’s memory of an event is a product of them
having personally experienced it (Tulving, 1985). Finally, Tulving
(2002) added proscopic chronesthesia (i.e., foresight), suggesting
the processes used to re-experience past events could also be uti-
lized to pre-experience future events. Fittingly, recent functional
magnetic imaging research supports Tulving’s view, demonstrat-
ing that the same brain areas are active when a person is asked to
reﬂect on a past event and simulate a future event (Addis et al.,
2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012).
While Tulving’s (1983) conceptualization of mental time travel
has changed over time, his view that it is a uniquely human ability
has remained unchanged. For example, Tulving opened his semi-
nal book, Elements of Episodic Memory, by stating “Remembering
past events is a universally familiar experience. It is also a uniquely
human one” (Tulving, 1983, pp. 1) and more than 20 years later
he restated this thesis, “Human beings possess a form of memory
(episodic memory) and a form of consciousness (autonoetic con-
sciousness, or “autonoesis”) that no other animals do. Thus, the
thesis is that these two aspects of the mind are unique in humans,
in the sense that the mental capacities that deﬁne them do not exist
in quite the same full-ﬂedged form in other species. They do not
exist in insects, in birds, in mice or rats, in cats or dogs, and not
even in gorillas and chimps” (Tulving, 2005, pp. 6). In addition to
restating his thesis, Tulving (2005) also proposed the spoon test,
a paradigm that would allow one to test it his claim that mental
time travel is uniquely human. At present, we believe the spoon
test is the best test of mental time travel that can be used with
both young children and non-human animals and, consequently,
it forms the backbone of this comparative review.
The spoon test builds on earlier proposals by Köhler (1922) and
Suddendorf (1994), both of which highlighted the potential signif-
icance of demonstrating that a non-human animal could prepare
in the present for a temporally distant event. To describe the spoon
test, Tulving refers to an Estonian children’s story in which “. . . a
young girl dreams about going to a friend’s birthday party where
the guests are served delicious chocolate pudding, her favorite. Alas,
all she can do is to watch other children eat it, because everybody
has to have her own spoon, and she did not bring one. So the next
evening, determined not to have the same disappointing experience
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again, she goes to bed clutching a spoon in her hand” (Tulving, 2005,
pp. 44). According to Tulving (2005) the young girl’s behavior
demonstrates that she is able to reﬂect on her experience of being
at the party without a spoon (i.e., episodic memory) and, by plac-
ing the spoon underneath her pillow, shows that she can entertain
the possibility she may again attend the party in her dreams (i.e.,
episodic foresight). Tulving (2005, pp. 44) suggests that if a non-
human animal were to pass an analogous version of the spoon test
it would “force the rejection” of his hypothesis that mental time
travel is uniquely human.
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES
Developmental studies of mental time travel provide an important
comparison when assessing mental time travel in non-human ani-
mals. Those working with non-human animals have been set an
ever growing number of criteria that their spoon tests must adhere
to (Tulving, 2005; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, 2010; Sudden-
dorf et al., 2009), however, one could argue that these criteria are
only relevant in so far as they have been upheld in developmental
studies that have concluded young children are capable of mental
time travel (Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Russell et al., 2010; Sud-
dendorf et al., 2011; Scarf et al., 2013; Atance and Sommerville,
2014; Payne et al., 2014). To this end, we will ﬁrst review the small
number of developmental studies that have employed the spoon
test to assess mental time travel in young children.
Suddendorf et al. (2011) presented 3- and 4-year-old children
with a novel problem, in which a specially shaped key could be
used to open a locked box. In the ﬁrst room, children were shown
a box with a triangle or cross shaped keyhole and the experimenter
demonstrated how a key that matched the shape of the keyhole
could be used to open it, revealing several stickers. Children were
then given the opportunity to perform the task twice themselves,
obtaining a sticker each time. Children were then distracted and
the key they had previously used to open the box was replaced
by a broken key. After demonstrating the broken key could not
be used to open the box, the experimenter ushered the child into
another room where they played games for 15 min. After 15 min
children were presented with four differently shaped keys, one of
which matched the key they used to open the box, and were told
they could pick one key to take with them back to the ﬁrst room.
While the majority of 4-year-olds (65%) chose the correct key, the
performance of the 3-year-olds (29%) was not signiﬁcantly above
chance.
Using a problem similar to that used by Suddendorf et al. (2011)
and Scarf et al. (2013) had 3- and 4-year-old children dig up a
locked treasure chest in a large outdoor sandbox. After establish-
ing that they did not have a key to open the treasure chest, the
experimenter asked children to go back to the lab with them. Chil-
dren then left the lab and returned after a 24 h delay. When they
returned to the lab, children were told they would be going back
out to the sandbox and were asked to pick one of three items (a key,
windup toy, or bouncy ball) to take with them. While a signiﬁcant
number of 4-year-old children selected the key, the performance of
3-year-old childrenwas no different from chance. To further inves-
tigate the impact of the delay on the performance of the 3-year-old
children, separate groups of 3-year-old children were tested after a
0, 15, or 30 min delay. The performance of the 3-year-old children
decreased in a linear fashion over the 0, 15, and 30 min delays.
The impact of the delay on the performance of 3-year-old chil-
dren (Scarf et al., 2013) suggests that, while 3-year-old children are
capable of mental time travel, they are constrained by their ability
to retain the original episode. Indeed, Atance and Sommerville
(2014) have demonstrated that if memory of the original episode
is controlled for, there is no difference between the performance
of 3- and 4-year-old children on the spoon test.
One potential limitation of the developmental studies reviewed
above is that they did not include a delay between the selec-
tion phase and children being given the opportunity to use the
item they selected. Thus, the studies only tested children’s fore-
sight for the very next event (Redshaw and Suddendorf, 2013).
However, building on Suddendorf et al. (2011) and Redshaw and
Suddendorf (2013) recently demonstrated that the performance
of 4-year-old children on the spoon test is not impacted by insert-
ing a 5-min delay after the selection phase, suggesting that the
mechanism used to plan for the very next event may be the same
mechanism used to plan for more distant events. It will be impor-
tant for future studies to investigate the potential impact of longer
delays. In addition, it is an open question as to whether 3-year-old
children are also unaffected by the imposition of a delay after the
selection phase.
COMPARATIVE STUDIES
Comparative studies of the spoon test have employed a different
procedure to that used in themajority of the developmental studies
reviewed above (cf. Redshaw and Suddendorf, 2013)1. Speciﬁcally,
rather than insert the delay between the original episode and the
selection phase, comparative studies have inserted the delay after
the selection phase (cf. Beran et al., 2012). This difference some-
what complicates the comparison between studies, because in all
the comparative studies there are examples of a subject selecting
the correct tool, but failing to transport it to the testing room fol-
lowing the delay. However, given that a subject may simply select
the correct tool due to the fact it has previously used it to obtain
food, for the comparative studies we will deﬁne a successful trial
as a subject selecting the correct tool, taking it with them to the
delay room, and transporting it to the testing room2.
The ﬁrst comparative study was conducted by Mulcahy and
Call (2006), who taught bonobos and orangutans to use a tool to
retrieve a reward from an apparatus. After learning this, the apes
were presented with several tools (two suitable and six unsuit-
able) in the testing room but with access to the baited apparatus
1The present review focuses on comparing the performance of children and non-
human animals on comparable spoon test paradigms. Due to this we have not
included the innovative series of studies conducted by Correia et al. (2007) and
Raby et al. (2007) with scrub-jays. Future developmental studies may look to adopt a
version of Clayton and colleagues’paradigm to see if children’s performance mirrors
that of the scrub-jays.
2This approach makes the calculation of chance somewhat difﬁcult due to the fact
there is no clear chance value for transporting the tool. However, given that all of the
studies we discuss coded tool transport as a binary outcome (i.e., either successful
or unsuccessful), we set the chance value for tool transport at 0.5. To calculate an
overall level of chance we then multiplied this value by the probability of selecting
the correct tool by chance, which is simply a function of the number of target and
non-target tools subjects had to choose from. The performance of each subject was
assessed using a binomial probability test (see Table 2).
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blocked. After 5 min, in which they were allowed to choose freely
between the items, the apes were ushered out of the testing room
and any tools that remained in the test room were removed. After
a 1 h delay, the apes were allowed back into the testing room with
the baited apparatus now accessible. Across 16 trials, subject’s per-
formance ranged from 13–94% (Table 1). However, while the
performance of subjects demonstrates they are capable of return-
ing to the test room with the tool after a signiﬁcant delay, any
conclusions drawn from this study are somewhat tempered by the
fact the animals made their selections with the apparatus in view,
raising the possibility that tool selection was cued.
Independently of Mulcahy and Call (2006) and Osvath and
Osvath (2008) trained two chimpanzees and one orangutan to use
a plastic hose to suck fruit soup from an apparatus. Once sub-
jects had learned this, they were called individually into a selection
room and given the opportunity to select one of four items, one of
which was the plastic hose. After selecting an item, subjects were
ushered out of the selection room and back into their enclosure.
Critically, from the selection room, subjects were not able to see
the apparatus or the room that it was housed in. After a 1-h delay,
subjects were allowed access to the testing room. Across 14 trials,
subject’s performance ranged from 79–86% (Table 1). In a sec-
ond experiment, Osvath and Osvath (2008) went one step further
by presenting a grape as one of the items subjects could choose.
Impressively, the performance of all three subjects was comparable
to that of the ﬁrst experiment, suggesting that they were able to
forgo the immediate reward in order to acquire a better reward in
the future.
In contrast toMulcahy and Call (2006) and Osvath and Osvath
(2008), Dufour and Sterck (2008) found little evidence chim-
panzees were capable of passing the spoon test. Dufour and Sterck
(2008) trained 10 chimpanzees to use a hook to obtain a bottle
of juice placed outside of their individual feeding compartment.
During testing, four categories of objects (hooks, straws, branches,
and sticks) were made available in a compartment that all subjects
could access. After 10 min, the items that remained in the com-
partment were removed. Testing occurred 1 h later, with subjects
invited to enter their feeding compartment. Surprisingly, across
Table 1 |The trial-by-trial performance of several primate species.
Species Individual Delay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Macaca fascicularis Anastasia1 5 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ekzekwo1 5 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Era1 5 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Icetea1 5 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ophelia1 5 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zargasso1 5 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pan troglodytes Phil2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ton2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Femma2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Peggy2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas2 60 min 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Kenny2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zorro2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Juus2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Iris2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Willy2 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
Linda3 70 min 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 − − −
Maria3 70 min 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 − − −
Pan paniscus Kuno4 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 −
Joey4 60 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −
Limbuko4 60 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 −
Pongo pygmaeus Walter4 60 min 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −
Toba4 60 min 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 −
Dokana4 60 min 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −
Pongo abelii Naong3 70 min 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 − − −
1Dekleva et al. (2012), Experiment 1a; 2Dufour and Sterck (2008), Experiment 5; 3Osvath and Osvath (2008), Experiment 1; 4Mulcahy and Call (2006), Experiment 1.
0 indicates an incorrect trial, 1 indicates a correct trial, and – indicates no trial.
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17 trials, only three subjects performed at least one trial correctly
(Table 1).
It is important to note that Dufour and Sterck’s (2008) study,
although including a standard version of the spoon test, focused
largely on an exchange version of the spoon test in which sub-
jects exchanged a token with a human, rather than used a
tool, to acquire food. Consistent with the performance of their
chimpanzees on the standard spoon test, the chimpanzees also per-
formed poorly on the exchange version of the task (Dufour and
Sterck, 2008). Two recent studies, however, have demonstrated
that chimpanzees (Osvath and Persson, 2013) and orangutans
and bonobos (Bourjade et al., 2014) can also successfully pass this
task.
As a whole, the comparative studies clearly show that there is
marked individual variation in the performance of several great
ape species on the spoon test. The high performance of some
individuals, however, suggests that, although not ubiquitous, some
great apes appear capable of mental time travel (Table 2).
ONE TRIAL TO RULE THEM ALL
Our conclusion that some great apes appear capable of men-
tal time travel is based on using the same criteria we (Scarf
et al., 2013) and others (Suddendorf et al., 2011) have used with
preschool children. One issue that must be addressed, however,
is the number of test trials the developmental and comparative
studies employ. While developmental studies have universally
tested children on only 1 trial, the comparative studies have
tested great apes on between 14 and 17 trials of the same prob-
lem. Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) have argued that mental
time travel can only be inferred if single trials are used due
to multiple trials (a) potentially resulting in associative learning
and, (b) raising the possibility subjects’ performance is based
Table 2 |The overall performance of several primate species compared to chance.
Species Individual % Selection Transport Overall p-value Rank Alpha Result
Macaca fascicularis Anastasia1 0 0.33 0.5 0.17 0.045 12 0.0036 ns
Ekzekwo1 0 0.33 0.5 0.17 0.045 13 0.0038 ns
Era1 0 0.33 0.5 0.17 0.045 14 0.0042 ns
Icetea1 0 0.33 0.5 0.17 0.045 15 0.0045 ns
Ophelia1 0 0.33 0.5 0.17 0.045 16 0.0050 ns
Zargasso1 0 0.33 0.5 0.17 0.045 17 0.0056 ns
Pan troglodytes Phil2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 18 0.0063 ns
Ton2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 19 0.0071 ns
Femma2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 20 0.0083 ns
Peggy2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 21 0.0100 ns
Thomas2 29 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.038 10 0.0031 ns
Kenny2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 22 0.0125 ns
Zorro2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 23 0.0167 ns
Juus2 29 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.038 11 0.0033 ns
Iris2 0 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.103 24 0.0250 ns
Willy2 41 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.002 7 0.0026 s
Linda3 79 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.000 3 0.0022 s
Maria3 86 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.000 2 0.0021 s
Pan paniscus Kuno4 44 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.002 5 0.0024 s
Joey4 13 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.289 25 0.0500 ns
Limbuko4 31 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.031 9 0.0029 ns
Pongo pygmaeus Walter4 38 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.008 8 0.0028 ns
Toba4 44 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.002 6 0.0025 s
Dokana4 94 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.000 1 0.0020 s
Pongo abelii Naong3 79 0.25 0.5 0.13 0.000 4 0.0023 s
1Dekleva et al. (2012), Experiment 1a; 2Dufour and Sterck (2008), Experiment 5; 3Osvath and Osvath (2008), Experiment 1; 4Mulcahy and Call (2006), Experiment 1.
Chance (Overall) was calculated by multiplying the chance of the subject selecting the correct tool (Selection), based on the number of target and non-target tools
made available, by the chance of the subject returning with the correct tool following the delay (Transport). The chance of a subject transporting the tool, given all
studies coded it as a binary outcome, was set at 0.5.The performance of each subject was assessed using a binomial probability test. Given the large number of tests
conducted, a modiﬁed Bonferroni correction was employed (Holm, 1979). Holm’s (1979) adjustment uses the rank of each p-value (Rank) to calculate the adjusted
alpha (Alpha).
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on generalization rather than a memory of a speciﬁc one-time
event.
Pragmatically, the single trial criterion is unrealistic. Indeed,
the apes cannot be verbally informed about the events that are
about to unfold and it is difﬁcult to see how they could possibly
anticipate the fact they are about to be presented with a novel
test. With respect to associative learning, one could argue that,
at present, the data do not accord with this account. Indeed, the
marked individual variation displayed by great apes is not con-
sistent with an associative account, which one would expect to
result in much more uniform performance. Further, an associa-
tive account would predict a decrease in performance across trials
rather than the increase Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) suggest.
As Osvath (2010) has pointed out, if associative learning was at
play, the value of selecting the tool would quickly diminish due
to the fact it cannot immediately be used to attain the reward it
has been associated with. Finally, in one of the few studies to test
monkeys, Dekleva et al. (2012) found that not a single monkey
on a single trial, of the 17 test trials each were given, was able
to pass the spoon test (Table 1). Again, given monkeys are quite
adept at associative learning, an associative account would predict
that monkeys would perform at a comparable level to great apes.
Of course, additional studies will need to be conducted to ensure
the failure of monkeys is due to the absence of mental time travel
rather than a contextual variable (Bitterman, 1964). The failure of
monkeys on the spoon test, however, is consistent with research
looking at the ability of monkeys to plan over shorter time scales
(Beran et al., 2004; Scarf and Colombo, 2009; Scarf et al., 2011a,b,
2014).
CONCLUSION
In summary, if we apply the same criterion that has been used in
developmental studies of mental time travel to studies conducted
with great apes, it seemswemust reject Tulving’s (2005) hypothesis
that mental time travel is uniquely human.
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